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Conscious awareness of the self as continuous through time is attributed to the human ability to remember the past and to predict the
future, a cogitation that has been called “mental time travel” (MTT). MTT allows one to re-experience one’s own past by subjectively
“locating” the self to a previously experienced place and time, or to pre-experience an event by locating the self into the future. Here, we
used a novel behavioral paradigm in combination with evoked potential mapping and electrical neuroimaging, revealing that MTT is
composed of two different cognitive processes: absoluteMTT, which is the location of the self to different points in time (past, present, or
future), and relativeMTT,which is the location of one’s self with respect to the experienced event (relative past and relative future). These
processes recruit a network of brain areas in distinct time periods including the occipitotemporal, temporoparietal, and anteromedial
temporal cortices. Our findings suggest that in addition to autobiographical memory processes, the cognitive mechanisms of MTT also
involvemental imageryandself-location, and that relativeMTT,butnot absoluteMTT, ismore stronglydirected to futureprediction than
to past recollection.
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Introduction
A fundamental characteristic of human conscious experience is
the ability to not only experience the present moment but also to
recall the past and predict the future, or to “travel” back and forth
in time, a facility that is called “mental time travel” (MTT) (Tulv-
ing, 1985, 2002; Atance andO’Neill, 2001; Levine, 2004; Levine et
al., 2004). MTT to the past is proposed to rely on episodic auto-
biographical memory, allowing one to re-experience one’s per-
sonal past through the subjective “location” of the self to a spe-
cific time and place that has previously been experienced
(Tulving, 1985, 2002; Levine, 2004; Levine et al., 2004). Compar-
atively, MTT to the future is thought to be based on “episodic
future thinking,” or the ability to mentally locate the self forward
to pre-experience an event (Ingvar, 1985; Atance and O’Neill,
2001; Okuda et al., 2003; Fellows and Farah, 2005). Converging
evidence from recent memory research suggests that re-
experiencing and pre-experiencing an event rely on similar neu-
ral mechanisms. Similar strategies and the same brain regions
were found to be used in imagining past and future events, as
future predictions may be based on past memories (Atance and
O’Neill, 2001; Okuda et al., 2003; Rugg et al., 2003; Fellows and
Farah, 2005; Addis et al., 2007; Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter and
Addis, 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007).
However, when changing the location of one’s self in time to
past or future, one does not only recall and predict, but one also
changes one’smental egocentric perspective on life events.More-
over, from these new self-locations in time, other life events
might be regarded differently with respect to their relations to
past or future. Thus, when imagining oneself as 10 years younger,
last year’s events are in the future (relative future) in relation to
the initially imagined self-location in time, and vice versa (rela-
tive past). Therefore, to investigate MTT, we developed a novel
behavioral paradigm by combining an autobiographical memory
paradigm (Atance and O’Neill, 2001; Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et
al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007)with an approach from experimen-
tal psychology on self-location and egocentric perspective taking
(Ratcliff, 1979; Parsons, 1987; Zacks et al., 1999; Blanke et al.,
2005; Arzy et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2006). These latter studies
showed behavioral and electrophysiological differences between
judgments about one’s own body while taken from one’s actual
spatial self-location versus different imagined self-locations.
Considering lines of evidence that have already suggested shared
mechanisms for processing time and space (Husserl, 1991; Coull
and Nobre, 1998; Nobre, 2001; Merleau-Ponty, 2002; Buckner
andCarroll, 2007), we hypothesized that self-location in time and
space may also share cognitive and neural mechanisms. More
specifically, we hypothesized that differences will be found not
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only between different self-locations in time (past, now, and fu-
ture) (Vogeley andKupke, 2007), but alsowhile imagining events
in the relative past or the relative future. Here, we investigate
these hypotheses and the neural correlates of MTT using behav-
ioral measures, evoked potential (EP) mapping, and electrical
neuroimaging in healthy adult participants.
Materials andMethods
Participants. Fourteen healthy volunteers (seven males, aged 29–38
years; mean SD, 31.5 2.9 years) participated in the experiment. All
participants were right handed, and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. All partic-
ipants gave written informed consent before inclusion in the study,
whichwas approved by the Ethical Committee of theUniversityHospital
of Geneva (Switzerland).
Stimuli and procedures. The experimental manipulation asked partic-
ipants to imagine themselves at three different self-locations in time: now
(the present time), past (10 years in the past), or future (10 years in the
future). In separate blocks for the past, now, and future self-locations,
two-word phrases (average length of 13.6  2.5 letters, mean  SD)
describing different common events from personal life (e.g., car license;
first child) or nonpersonal world events (e.g., Challenger explosion; hur-
ricane Katrina) known to the participants were presented on a computer
screen (Fig. 1). Note, that nonpersonal events are also intimately related
to autobiographical memory for personal temporal, spatial, and mental
information associated with these events; the terms “personal” and
“nonpersonal” are used here in relative terms. Participants were asked to
indicate whether the presented event took place before (relative past) or
after (relative future) the currently imagined self-location in time (Fig.
1). For example, in the now or future blocks, participant should indicate
“past” for the hurricane Katrina, but in the past block they should indi-
cate “future,” because it has not been 10 years since the event. However,
if they are anticipating their first child in the next few years they should
indicate “future” for “first child” in the past and now blocks but “past” in
the future block. Thus, we examined MTT independently from the sub-
ject’s self-location in time (past, now, or future) as the same event could
be relatively in the past or in the future with respect to the imagined
temporal self-location. Accordingly, we labeled this latter distinction rel-
ativeMTT (rMTT), whereas theMTT between different self-locations in
time was labeled absolute MTT (aMTT).
Stimuli were designed to be in the range of15 years of the imagined
self-location in time. They included events that were chosen from most
common personal life events for the personal items, and from major
headline news events for the nonpersonal items, and appeared for 700ms
in the center of the computer screen with an interstimulus interval of
2000 ms. Although previous behavioral, EP, and neuroimaging studies
on MTT and autobiographical memory (Conway et al., 2001, 2003;
Okuda et al., 2003; Rugg et al., 2003; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al.,
2007) presented stimuli for several seconds, to investigate self-location in
time, presented stimuli here for relatively short epochs, similarly to pre-
vious experiments on self-location in space (Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et
al., 2006, 2007). Judgments were given using index andmiddle fingers of
the left and right hand in alternating blocks as a button press on a serial
response box. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly and
precisely as possible while maintaining amental
image of themselves in the appropriate tempo-
ral self-location (past, now, or future), which
were performed in six blocks (each repeated
once) and counterbalanced across subjects.
Each block included 120 stimuli, equally dis-
tributed among four groups: self (personal
events) in relative past, self in relative future,
nonself (world events) in relative past, and non-
self in relative future, appearing in random
order.
Analysis of behavioral data. Subsequent to the
experiment, participants were asked to approx-
imate the dates of the presented events. Correct
responses were determined according to the es-
timated dates, as provided separately by each participant. Repeated-
measures ANOVAswere run between participants on reaction time (RT)
and error rate (ER)with the factors aMTT (past, now, and future), rMTT
(relative past and relative future), and self (self and nonself events).
EEG recording, EP mapping, and distributed linear inverse solution.
Continuous electroencephalography (EEG) recordings were acquired
with a BioSemi system from 192 scalp electrodes (impedances, 5 k;
vertex referenced; 2048Hz digitization; bandpass filtered, 0.1–100H z) in
a darkened, electrically shielded booth. Epochs of EEG (from 0 to 800ms
after stimulus onset) were averaged for each of the experimental condi-
tions in each subject to calculate the EPs. Trials with blinks or eye move-
ments were rejected off-line, using horizontal and vertical electro-
oculograms. An artifact criterion of  100 V was applied at all other
electrodes, and each EEG epoch was also visually evaluated before its
inclusion in the EP. Before group averaging, EPs were bandpass filtered
(1–40Hz) and recalculated against the average reference. EP analysis was
based on the examination of the spatial variations of the scalp voltage
distribution over time and between conditions, an approach known as
EP mapping (Michel et al., 2001, 2004; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al.,
2006). This approach searches for time segments of stable map topogra-
phy that represent functional microstates of the brain during informa-
tion processing. EP segments were defined by using a spatial k-means
cluster analysis to identify the dominant map topographies on the scalp
in the group-averaged EPs across the experimental conditions over time
(Pascual-Marqui et al., 1995;Michel et al., 2001, 2004; Blanke et al., 2005;
Arzy et al., 2006). These maps are the mean maps over the period where
the segment was found. The optimal number of these templatemaps was
determined by a modified cross-validation criterion (Pascual-Marqui et
al., 1995). In a second step, the presence of a given EPmap as identified in
the group-averaged data were verified statistically in the EPs of the indi-
vidual participants. This allowed us to determine the duration of a given
EPmap for each self-location in time across participants. These duration
values for a given EP map can then be subjected to statistical analysis.
Statistical comparisons were performed on the duration of each map
(dependent variable) in the individual EPs using repeated-measures
ANOVAs, with the factors aMTT, rMTT, and self. The same analysis was
performed for the amplitude of themean global field power of eachmap,
which is defined as the spatial root mean squared across all electrodes
(Lehmann and Skrandies, 1980). Finally, the neural generators for a
given mean EP map were estimated by applying a distributed linear in-
verse solution, based on a local autoregressive average (LAURA model)
(Grave de Peralta Menendez et al., 2004).
Results
Behavior
Data showed that RTs and ERs in past and future self-locations
were significantly higher than in the now (F(2,26)  12.5, p 
0.001; F(2,26) 7.2, p 0.01, respectively) (Fig. 2A). We refer to
this effect for the three different self-locations in time as the
aMTT effect. Interestingly, there was also a behavioral rMTT
effect, where participants were always faster for relative future
than for relative past events, with respect to their imagined tem-
poral self-location, across all self-locations (RTs, F(1,13)  18.9,
Figure 1. Stimuli and procedure. The three different self-locations in time (past, now, and future) are shown. Participants
were asked to mentally imagine themselves in one of these self-locations, and from these self-locations to judge whether
different self or nonself events (e.g., top row) already happened (relative past, darker colors) or are yet to happen (relative future,
lighter colors).
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p 0.001; ERs, F(1,13) 5.8, p 0.01) (Fig.
2A). There was no interaction of aMTT
rMTT (RTs, F(2,26)  0.34, p  0.71; ERs,
F(2,26) 1.8, p 0.18) (for more statistics
and post hoc tests, see supplemental Tables
1, 2, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material). Behavioral results
also showed an effect of self (self-related
faster than non-self-related events; F(1,13)
 28.64, p 0.001) (supplemental Tables
1, 2, available at www.jneurosci.org as sup-
plemental material). These effects are in-
dependent of one another as no interac-
tions were found among them.
The aMTT effect corroborates previous
behavioral data showing similar effects of
MTT to past and future when asking sub-
jects to imagine past and future events
(Atance and O’Neill, 2001; Okuda et al.,
2003; Addis et al., 2007; Szpunar et al.,
2007). We provide novel evidence for re-
sponse facilitation for relative future
events (rMTT effect), which are faster and
more accurate. Note that this was found
independent of the actual events imagined.
This suggests that mental processing of
events is future oriented across all investi-
gated self-locations in time as has recently
been speculated (Dudai and Carruthers,
2005; Schacter and Addis, 2007).
Electrical neuroimaging
EPmapping of the group-averaged data re-
vealed a distinct brain segment of stable
voltage topography (or EP map) that dis-
tinguished the past and future from the
now self-location. The map appeared be-
tween 500 to 600ms after stimulus presen-
tation (Fig. 2B, segment 14) and lasted sig-
nificantly longer in the past and future self-
locations than in the now (aMTT effect;
F(2,26) 3.8; p 0.03) (Fig. 2B,C). In fur-
ther agreement with response facilitation
for relative future events, this brain activa-
tionwas shorter for relative future than rel-
ative past events (rMTT effect; F(1,13) 
5.6; p  0.01) independently of the imag-
ined self-location in time (no significant
interaction, F(2,26)  0.9; p  0.42) (Fig.
2C, right) (supplemental table 3, available
at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental ma-
terial). A self effect (shorter brain activity
for self-related than non-self-related
events) was also found for this EP map (F(1,13)  4.7; p  0.02)
with no significant interaction (F(2,26)  1.0; p  0.32) (supple-
mental Table 3, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material), in-line with the behavioral data. There were no signif-
icant modulations with respect to the strength of brain activa-
tions in the different self-locations (supplemental Table 3, avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). A linear
inverse solution (Grave de Peralta Menendez et al., 2004) local-
ized this map to regions of the left anteromedial temporal cortex,
right temporoparietal junction, and occipitotemporal cortex
(Fig. 2D). Notably, only this EP map showed effects of aMTT,
rMTT, and self, reflecting behavioral data, suggesting that this
map most closely reflects neural activity associated with mental
time travel (MTT map).
An earlier map appearing between 300 to 400 ms after stimu-
lus onset (Fig. 2B, segment 11)was significantly longer and stron-
ger in the future than in the past and now self-locations (future
effect; duration, F(2,26) 4.2, p 0.02) (Fig. 2C, left). The dura-
tion and strength of this brain activation did not show a signifi-
cant effect of rMTT (duration, F(1,13)0.8, p0.4) and no signif-
Figure 2. Behavioral and EP data. A, RTs and ERs are plotted separately for past (blue), now (red), and future (green) self-
locations in time. Error bars indicate intersubject SEM. Note the significantly higher RTs and ERs for past and future with respect
to the now. In addition, in all self-locations (past, now, future) RTs and ERs were higher for the relative past (left bars, darker
colors) than the relative future (right bars, lighter colors). B, Segments of stable map topography in the three temporal self-
locations under the global field power curve from0 to 800ms. EP segment 11 (futuremap)was found at300–400ms andwas
significantly longer for future self-location (green) than for the past (blue) and now (red). EP segment 14 (MTT map) was found
at500–600 ms and was significantly longer for past and future self-locations than for the now. C, Map topography and
duration ofMTTmap (right) and futuremap (left) for the three experimental self-locations for all participants. Note that duration
of the MTT map parallels the behavioral results. In all temporal self-locations MTT map duration was longer for the relative past
(left bars, darker colors) than for the relative future (rightbars, lighter colors).D, Generators ofMTTmapwere localized to the right
temporoparietal, occipitotemporal, and left anteromedial temporal cortices.
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icant interaction (duration, F(1,13)0.9, p  0.4) or self effect
(duration, F(1,13)0.4, p  0.7) (for strength statistics, see sup-
plemental Table 4, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemen-
tal material). The same linear inverse solution localized this seg-
ment to the occipitotemporal cortex bilaterally (supplemental
Fig. 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
This brain activity precedes the MTT map, and is significantly
associated with the future self-location, but not other self-
locations or an effect of self.
To summarize, these EP data corroborate the behavioral re-
sults, with an EP map at 500–600 ms after stimulus onset show-
ing independent effects of aMTT (different self-locations in time:
past, now, and future), rMTT (relative future or relative past with
respect to the imagined self-location in time), and self (self-
related vs non-self-related events). In addition, an earlier EP
map, at 300–400 ms after stimulus onset, was found to be asso-
ciated only with the future self-location in time. These MTT as-
sociated cognitive processes recruit occipitotemporal, tem-
poroparietal, and anteromedial temporal cortices between 300
and 600 ms after stimulus onset.
Discussion
In this study, we designed a paradigm combining concepts from
autobiographical memory research, mental imagery, and self-
location to investigateMTT to the past and future. This paradigm
allowed us to disentangle mechanisms of MTT and self-location
in time, at least partly, from memory related mechanisms, in
behavioral and neural terms. The paradigm asks participants to
change their self-location in time to the past, the now, or the
future (aMTT), and then to determine whether events happened
before (relative past) or will happen after (relative future) the
imagined self-location in time (rMTT). These two aspects of
MTT were reflected at the behavioral level, as RTs and ERs were
higher for past and future self-locations in time than in the now
self-location (aMTT effect). In addition, in all self-locations in
time, participants were faster and more accurate to the relative
future than relative past (rMTT effect). These effects were also
borne out at the neural level (MTT map), as at 500 ms after
stimulus presentation a network consisting of the anteromedial
temporal, temporoparietal, and occipitotemporal cortices was
activated in the past and future self-locations longer than in the
now (aMTT), and in all self-locations this activation was shorter
for relative future events than relative past events (rMTT).
The aMTT effect in the current study confirms that MTT to
the past and future share brain mechanisms and is in line with
previous work (Atance and O’Neill, 2001; Okuda et al., 2003;
Addis et al., 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Hassabis et al.,
2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). The novel rMTT effect, in which
participants were always faster and more accurate for relative
future than relative past events, independent of their temporal
self-location, provides experimental evidence for proposals that
MTT is used principally to anticipate future occurrences
(Schacter, 2001; Schacter et al., 2003; Dudai and Carruthers,
2005; Schacter and Addis, 2007). This is also supported by the
activation of the occipitotemporal cortex that was primarily
found for future self-location (future map), peaking as early as
300–400 ms after stimulus presentation, therefore indicating
early processing for future events. These activations were found
earlier than those reported in previous EP studies on autobio-
graphical memory (Conway et al., 2001, 2003; Rugg et al., 2003).
Although longer processing timesmight be important for the full
construction of autobiographical memory and MTT as assessed
in these previous studies, the present approach allows to study
MTT and self-location in time during shorter time-periods. We
speculate that both approaches may rely on the activation of
partly different brain networks, but would argue that the crucial
or sufficient brain areas encoding MTT involve self-location in
time, and are therefore engaged when using the present experi-
mental strategy. The importance of short time periods in MTT is
also suggested by the observation that MTT is crucial for quick
decision making (Boyer, 2008), as is simulated in the current
study.
Our data also showed a self effect in which participants re-
sponded significantly faster to self-related than non-self-related
events, an effect that we also found in our EP data as we found
shorter brain activity at the anteromedial temporal, temporopa-
rietal, and occipitotemporal cortices for self-related than non-
self-related events. Indeed, psychological data have suggested
that self-representation involves personal identity and continuity
across time. The “narrative” self, which is a self-representation
constituted with past and future in stories that we and others tell
about ourselves (Dennett, 1991; Gallagher, 2000), and the “ex-
tended” self, based on memory and anticipation (Neisser, 1995),
may be related concepts. As cognitive representations of the self
develop across time, information from past experiences becomes
incorporated in self-representation (Markus, 1977). Access to
this information is privileged, with subjects showing twice as ef-
ficient recall of self-related items than non-self-related items in a
phenomenon labeled the self reference effect (Symons and John-
son, 1997), which may also be relevant to our findings. However,
the future map, which did not show main effects or interactions
involving self/nonself distinction, suggests that there are perspec-
tives from which there may be less distinction between self- and
non-self-related events.
Our EP recordings show that self-location in time recruits a
distributed neural network including the occipitotemporal, an-
teromedial temporal, and temporoparietal cortices. The activa-
tion of the occipitotemporal cortex is in agreement with previous
neuroimaging studies that found recruitment of the occipitotem-
poral cortex in autobiographical memory tasks (Maguire, 2001;
Conway et al., 2002; Svoboda et al., 2006; Addis et al., 2007).
Some have proposed that the occipitotemporal cortex might be
involved in recall through visual imagery (Rubin and Greenberg,
1998; Conway et al., 2002; Slotnick and Schacter, 2006; Svoboda
et al., 2006). In addition, clinical studies have described amnesia
with isolated or predominant damage to striate and occipitotem-
poral cortex (Ogden, 1993; Hunkin et al., 1995). Together, these
data suggest that occipitotemporal cortex plays a central role in
MTT and self-location in time.
Activation was also found in anteromedial temporal cortex,
which has been proposed to be a crucial structure for processing
both semantic knowledge and autobiographical information, as
found in clinical and neuroimaging studies (Corkin, 2002; Levine
et al., 2004; Squire et al., 2004; Svoboda et al., 2006). Our data
suggest that this area may also play a key role in MTT, which is
based on similar cognitive processes (Okuda et al., 2003; Addis et
al., 2007; Buckner and Carroll, 2007), as was shown recently also
in amnestic patients (Hassabis et al., 2007).
Finally, we show that the temporoparietal junction is activated
during temporal judgments from different self-locations in time.
This region has been shown previously to be involved in many
self-related tasks such as visuospatial perspective taking (Ruby
and Decety, 2001; Vogeley and Fink, 2003), mental own-body
imagery (Zacks et al., 1999), and own-action recognition (Farrer
and Frith, 2002). Particularly, previous work has shown that the
temporoparietal junction is a structure crucial for self-location in
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space, as participants showed different behavioral patterns and
brain activitieswhile imagining themselves from their ownbodily
spatial self-location or from an external bodily self-location, as
well as while imagining looking at themselves from the front or
back (Zacks et al., 1999; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Vogeley and
Fink, 2003; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et al., 2006, 2007). The cur-
rent data extend these findings by showing that the temporopa-
rietal junction encodes not only self-location in space but also
self-location in time. Finally, in addition to the similarity in brain
activity between spatial and temporal self-processing, the time
window of electrophysiological correlates of aMTT and rMTT
overlaps with those described in previous event-related studies
on self-location and mental imagery of self in space (Zacks et al.,
1999; Coull et al., 2000; Nobre, 2001; Blanke et al., 2005; Arzy et
al., 2006, 2007). This spatiotemporal electrophysiological simi-
larity also supports the hypothesis that MTT may not only in-
volvememorymechanisms, but alsomechanisms related tomen-
tal imagery and self-location.
In conclusion, in the present study we found two independent
components ofMTT: absoluteMTT, which is thementally imag-
ined self-location in time (past, now, and future), and relative
MTT, which is the relation between this temporal self-location
and the experienced event (relative past or relative future). The
latter effect suggests that mental processing of events is more
strongly directed to future prediction than to past recollection, as
participantswere faster andmore accurate for relative future than
relative past events across all self-locations in time. Moreover, of
all tested temporal self-locations, future was also processed earli-
est at the neural level. This may indicate that the neural systems
subserving MTT have evolved to anticipate and pilot our behav-
ior rather than primarily encoding the past (Haselton andNettle,
2006; Boyer, 2008). Finally, MTT was found to be processed
faster for self-related than non-self-related events, although both
were processed with respect to the subject’s imagined self-
location in time. Three brain regions were found to be recruited
for self-location in time: the occipitotemporal cortex, contribut-
ing toMTT,mental imagery, and visualmemory, the temporopa-
rietal junction, which is a crucial region for self-related process-
ing and self-location, and the anteromedial temporal cortex, a
core region in memory and spatial processing. This network of
regions indicates how MTT requires not only memory skills but
also self-location and mental imagery elements.
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